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Obrar mucho, y hablar poco; que lo demás es de loco.
Barrapunto © 1999-2007. Contenido disponible bajo licencia Creative Commons Reconocimiento 2.5
Aviso legal
Barrapunto © 1999-2007. Contenido disponible bajo licencia Creative Commons Reconocimiento 2.5
Aviso legal
Re:Freenet
(Puntos:3, Informativo)( http://ramonrey.net/ | Última bitácora: Sábado, 15 Diciembre de 2007, 14:11h )
El contenido del que tu haces "proxy/mirror" en Freenet esta cifrado usando criptografia fuerte y no sabes cual es el contenido del mismo. De hecho, sin tener la clave para cada contenido de Freenet, no puedes acceder a el, por lo que no se te puede acusar de absolutamente nada, de ahi su genialidad como protector de la libertad de expresion.
Re:-1 Desinformativo
(Puntos:1, Divertido)Re:-1 Desinformativo
(Puntos:3, Informativo)Won't attack X break Freenet's anonymity?
Short answer: Probably yes.
Long answer: Freenet does not offer true anonymity in the way that the Mixmaster and cypherpunk remailers do. Most of the non-trivial attacks (advanced traffic analysis, compromising any given majority of the nodes, etc.) that these were designed to counter would probably be successful in identifying someone making requests on Freenet. On Freenet, whatever you do, your identity is still revealed to the first Freenet Node you talk to, and even if you limit yourself to talk only to trusted nodes (a feature that will be implemented in the future), they will have to talk to the rest of the network at some time or another. The anonymity that Freenet offers is really just obscurity in the fact that it is hard to prove that your node wasn't proxying the request for or insert of data on behalf of somebody else (who might also just have been proxying it).
The problem is that the only way that you can offer true anonymity is if the client can directly control the routing of data, and thus encrypt it with a series of keys of the nodes it will pass through (a la Mixmaster). Freenet's dynamic routing cannot offer that, so to attain true anonymity you have to send the message through an external network of anonymous remailers first (a future SMTP->Freenet bridge would make this possible). There are also plans for doing mixmaster-style injection of requests over the "standard" protocol, however this probably won't be implemented before version 1.0, which is still some way off.
En definitiva, recordando esto se me fue la perola.
Disculpa a los lectores de /.
Avengers Assemble!!