Je, justo la complejidad del código era un argumento en contra de la Iniciativa de Defensa Estrátegica de Reagan y ahora de la defensa antimisiles de Bush:
Risks 21.43:
The individual essays explain:
1. The fundamental technological differences between software engineering and other areas of engineering and why software is unreliable;
2. The properties of the proposed SDI software that make it unattainable;
3. Why the techniques commonly used to build military software are inadequate for this job;
4. The nature of research in software engineering, and why the improvements that it can effect will not be sufficient to allow xonstruction of a truly reliable strategic defense system;
5. Why I do not expect research in artificial intelligence to help in building reliable military software;
6. Why I do not expect research in automatic programming to bring about the substantial improvements that are needed;
7. Why program verification (mathematical proofs of correctness) cannot give us a reliable strategic defense battle-management system;
8. Why military funding of research in software and other aspects of computing science is inefficient and ineffective.
Have we really made sufficient advances in software engineering--in the way we build large systems, in reliability, in safety, in testability--so that this kind of project is more workable now than it was 18 years ago? Would
David Parnas be less likely to resign from such an advisory panel today?
Los antimisiles de Bush
(Puntos:3, Interesante)( http://barrapunto.com/tags/restalman | Última bitácora: Jueves, 12 Abril de 2018, 20:25h )
Risks 21.43:
__
Comprare è combattere.